Using a GARCH model we provide evidence that higher inflation uncertainty leads to higher inflation in the new European Union (EU) member states and candidate countries only prior to EU accession. During EU accession and entry inflation uncertainty has no effect on mean inflation. This result supports the consideration of policy regime shifts in assessing the nominal uncertainty-average inflation relationship.
Introduction
The relationship between nominal uncertainty and inflation has received substantial attention in the last two decades (see Grier and Perry, 1998; Fountas, 2001; Bredin and Fountas, 2009; Daal et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Thornton, 2008) . The issue, however, of how could this relationship be influenced in the presence of policy regime shifts has not been considered.
1 This paper addresses this issue by investigating the causal impact of inflation uncertainty on average inflation for the new member states and candidate countries of the European Union (EU) by assessing the effect before and after EU accession. Given that upon accession to the EU, member states are obliged to pursue price stability as their primary objective of monetary policy (Ecofin, 2000) , this policy regime shift may influence the way inflation uncertainty impacts upon inflation.
The impact of inflation uncertainty on inflation has been modelled by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) in a game-theoretic model of central bank behavior according to which higher inflation uncertainty raises the average inflation rate. Using the Barro-Gordon model, where agents face uncertainty about both the rate of money supply growth (and hence inflation) and the policy-maker's objective function, they show that an increase in uncertainty about money growth and inflation raises the optimal average inflation rate because it provides an incentive to the policymaker to create an inflation surprise in order to stimulate output growth. Thus the lack of a commitment mechanism to control the inflation rate produces an inflationary bias in equilibrium. By contrast, Holland (1995) argues that inflation uncertainty has a negative impact on the inflation rate owing to the central bank's stabilizing policy. With an independent central bank and a clear commitment to long-run price stability, monetary authorities when faced with more inflation uncertainty apply tight monetary policy, and hence reduce average inflation, in order to minimize the real costs of inflation uncertainty.
According to both these studies, the commitment of monetary authorities to price stability is essential for the sign of the effect running from inflation uncertainty to inflation. Given that EU accession offers a commitment mechanism for controlling the inflation rate, we use the timing of the EU admission process to test for the sign of the effect. One would expect the effect to be potentially positive before EU accession when a commitment mechanism against inflationary biases may not be in place and then, at the very least, to diminish in size as a country progresses through the EU accession stages. Our empirical findings corroborate this intuition as we offer strong evidence in favor of the CukiermanMeltzer hypothesis prior to EU accession but a largely zero effect during EU accession and entry for the large majority of the countries that underwent this transition. The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the model, section 3 presents the results, and section 4 offers our conclusions.
Data and Methodology
We use seasonally adjusted data of the monthly consumer price index ( A GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) model has been widely used to test the CukiermanMeltzer and Holland hypotheses (see Grier et al., 2004) . 3 To capture the causal impact of inflation uncertainty on inflation and its potential difference during the EU accession period, we augment a simple GARCH-M model with (up to) four EU-related dummy variables. These enter multiplicatively to the volatility variable and represent the periods before the country embarks upon negotiations for entry into the EU, the beginning of the negotiations (stage 1), the conclusion of the negotiations (stage 2), and after which admission has been granted (stage 3). On the other hand, Iceland has only recently (July 2009) applied for EU membership. The data cover different periods depending on availability with the shortest time period applying to Bulgaria (1998 Bulgaria ( :1 -2010 :2) and the longest to Malta (1957 Malta ( :1-2010 :2) -see Table 1 for details. 3 An alternative approach is to use a two-step methodology where in the first step one estimates GARCH models to generate a measure of inflation uncertainty and in the second carry out Granger causality tests (see Grier and Perry, 1998) . Pagan (1984) however criticizes this two-step procedure for its misspecifications due to the use of generated variables from the first stage as regressors in the second stage. It follows then that the simultaneous conditional mean and variance estimation within a GARCH-M model is more efficient than a two-step approach. For this reason we opt to use this technique. 4 The dates for each stage are available at the EU website http://europa.eu/abc/history and are as follows.
All new member states except Bulgaria and Romania began their negotiations in March of 1998, concluded
where π t is the rate of inflation, i 
Results
As our goal is to test for the impact of nominal uncertainty on average inflation in the fourteen newly EU-affiliated countries, we focus our attention on the statistical significance and signs of ψ n (n=1,2,3,4). Table 2 presents the estimation results of the three model specifications described by equations (1) The lag order is defined using the Schwartz Information Criterion. Maximum lag order is set to 12. 6 We have also experimented with a model where the EU-related dummies (dum n ) were directly incorporated in equation (1) impact is restricted in stage 2 of the process. Other than these, there is no evidence of separate effects at each stage of the admission process. 8 The standardized residual diagnostic tests at the bottom of the table suggest that the model is well specified.
Conclusions
This study examines the causal impact of inflation uncertainty on inflation for the new EU member states and candidate countries using a GARCH-M model. The innovation lies in the use of dummy variables related to the dates of EU accession to capture the existence of non-linear effects in this relationship. Once we control for this 'EU effect', we find evidence that inflation uncertainty increases inflation in the majority of the countries in the pre-EU accession period but bears no effect during EU accession and entry. Our findings corroborate the importance of controlling for shifts in (monetary) policy regimes. Coefficients in bold type represent significance at least at the 10% level. LR is the likelihood ratio test for ψ 1 = ψ 2-4 of Chi-square(1) (critical value at 5% significance level is 3.84). LR tests for ψ 2 = ψ 3 = ψ 4 of Chi-square(1) (critical value for 5% significance level is 5.99). LB (.) and LB (.) 2 are the Ljung-Box statistics for 4 th and 12 th order serial correlation in the residuals and squared residuals respectively. LM(1) is Engle's LM test statistic of Chi-square(1) testing for remaining ARCH effects.
